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Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that a claim for damages resulting from legal malpractice is assignable and the attorney-client relationship may no
longer be used to protect an attorney from the consequences of
legal malpractice.

ASSIGNMENTS-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-The

Hedlund Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spiyak, 517 Pa. 522, 539 A.2d 357 (1988).
In January 1978, Mervin Martin (Martin) procured the services
of attorney Karl L. Spivak (Spivak), a patent attorney and partner
in the Philadelphia law firm of Weiser, Stapler & Spivak (Weiser &
Stapler), in order to apply for a patent on a manure spreader Martin invented and manufactured.1 Spivak prepared the patent application with plenty of time to file it within one year of the date of
the first sale, as required by federal patent law.2 Spivak, however,
did not file the application until roughly two years after the date of
3
the first sale.
In December, 1980, Hedlund Manufacturing Company, Inc.
(Hedlund) bought Martin's business, along with the right to use
and license the patent pending on the manure spreader.4 The
United States Patent Office subsequently issued a notice of allowance of patent for the manure spreader pursuant to section 151 of
the federal patent laws" in February, 1981.6 Hedlund later learned
1. Hedlund Mfg. Co., Inc., v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 517 Pa. 522, 539 A.2d 357
(1988).
2. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States...
Id.
3. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 523, 539 A.2d at 358.
4. Id.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) provides:
If it appears that applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, a written notice of
allowance of the application shall be given or mailed to the applicant. The notice
shall specify a sum, constituting the issue fee or a portion thereof, which shall be paid
within three months thereafter.
Upon payment of this sum the patent shall issue, but if payment is not timely made,
the application shall be regarded as abandoned.
Any remaining balance of the issue fee shall be paid within three months from the
sending of a notice thereof and, if not paid, the patent shall lapse at the termination
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that the application for the patent was filed late, and, as required
by federal regulation,7 notified the patent office. 8 In May, 1981,
Martin assigned all of his ownership rights in the manure spreader
patent application to Hedlund.9 In July, Martin assigned to the
Hedlund Company his cause of action against Spivak and his law
firm for mishandling the manure spreader patent application. 0
Hedlund filed a complaint in trespass and assumpsit in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging negligence and
breach of contract." The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in September, 1981, declined to issue a patent on the
2
manure spreader.1
Weiser & Stapler and Spivak filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Hedlund lacked standing to sue.' 3 The court of
common pleas granted the motion,' and Hedlund appealed to the
of this three-month period. In calculating the amount of a remaining balance, charges
for a page or less may be disregarded.
If any payment required by this section is not timely made, but is submitted with the
fee for delayed payment and the delay in payment is shown to have been unavoidable, it may be accepted by the Commissioner as though no abandonment or lapse had
ever occurred.
Id.
6. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 523, 539 A.2d at 358.
7. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1985), which provides:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademarks Office rests on
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application
and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or
prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All
such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of
which is material to the examination of the application. Such information is material
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty
is commensurate with the degree of involvement in the preparation or prosecution of
the application.
Id.
8. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 524, 539 A.2d at 358.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The motion for summary judgment was filed pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1035 (Purdon 1987).
14. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358. The trial court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding a lack of privity between Hedlund and
Weiser. The supreme court subsequently determined, with respect to the trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment, that:
A trial court must grant a motion for summary judgment where 'there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.' Pa.R.Civ.P. Rule 1035. We find herein that appellees were not entitled
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Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which, in a per curiam memorandum opinion, affirmed the decision of the trial court.1 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Hedlund's petition for allowance
of appeal."6
The supreme court, in a 4-2 decision, determined that attorney
Spivak and his law firm were not entitled to summary judgment
and reversed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in
the attorneys' favor.1 7 Justice Larsen, writing for the majority,1 8
stated that the issue in the case was whether a cause of action for
legal malpractice consisting of negligence and breach of contract
can be assigned.1 9 The court stated that Pennsylvania has long
permitted the assignments of causes of action,2" citing Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.2 1 The Hedlund court, based
upon the holding in Gray, also observed that where a cause of action is assigned, privity is not an issue because the assignee stands
in the shoes of the assignor and does not pursue the suit in his own
right.2 2
to a judgment as a matter of law, and we hereby reverse.
Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Hedlund Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 356 Pa. Super. 622,
512 A.2d 1293 (1986)(unpublished opinion). The superior court determined, relying upon
Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983), "that appellant [Hedlund] lacked
standing to sue appellees [Weiser & Stapler] for alleged negligence and breach of contract."
517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358.
16. Hedlund Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 514 Pa. 647, 524
A.2d 493 (1987).
17. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358.
18. The majority consisted of Justices Larsen, McDermott, Zappala and Papadakos.
Justice Stout did not participate and Justice Flaherty filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Nix joined.
19. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 523, 539 A.2d at 537.
20. Id. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358. Justice Larsen also relied upon Coons v. Borough of
McKees Rocks, 243 Pa. 340, 90 A. 141 (1914), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the assignment of a cause of action for damages to real property which resulted from
the defendant borough's changing the grade of a street in front of the damaged property. Id.
at 346, 90 A. at 144. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
Justice Larsen also cited Galey v. Mellon, 172 Pa. 443, 33 A. 560 (1896), where it was held
that a party to an executory contract may assign that contract to a third party, along with
all rights enjoyed by the original contracting party thereunder, including the right to sue for
breach of contract. Id. at 446, 33 A. at 560. For further discussion of this case, see infra
notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
21. 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966). Gray held that an insured, whose insurer acted in
bad faith in settling a claim arising out of an automobile accident, in breach of its contract
with the insured which resulted in the injured third party receiving a judgment exceeding
the policy limits, could assign his cause of action against the insurer to the injured third
party. Id. at 510, 223 A.2d at 12.
22. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358 (citing Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
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After establishing that the assignment of a cause of action is
generally permissible, the supreme court dealt with the issue of
whether, in the instant case, the assignor, Martin, had a cause of
action against Weiser & Stapler and Spivak.2 3 Justice Larsen determined that because Martin could have filed a complaint against
Spivak and his firm for negligence and breach of contract for their
failure to file the patent application on time, there was "no question" that Martin had a cause of action against Weiser & Stapler
and Spivak.2 4
A second issue decided in Hedlund was whether the claim was
for damages for personal injury.15 The court considered this issue
to be of paramount importance, as the assignment of a cause of
action for personal injury is not permitted in Pennsylvania.2" As
authority regarding this issue, Justice Larsen first cited Sniderman
v. Nerone,2 7 which held that unliquidated clams for damages for
personal injuries are not assignable or subject to attachment.2 8
Next, the majority cited Sensenig v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 9 where the supreme court held that a "strictly personal"
cause of action is not assignable.3 0 The court concluded with Hurley v. Hurley,"1 which also held that claims for personal injuries
32
are not assignable.
Justice Larsen, in Hedlund, went on to state that one of the reasons a personal injury cause of action cannot be assigned is that
the injury involves rights which are personal to the injured party
and of concern only to that party.33 A damage claim for legal malpractice stemming from negligence and breach of contract, accord422 Pa. 500, 507, 223 A.2d 8, 9 (1966)). For further discussion of Gray, see infra notes 72-93
and accompanying text.
23. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 356.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 336 Pa. 305, 9 A.2d 335, aff'g per curiam, 136 Pa. Super. 381, 7 A.2d 496 (1939).
28. Sniderman, 136 Pa. Super. at 384, 7 A.2d at 498. For further discussion of this
case, see infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
29. 229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910).
30. Id. at 170, 78 A. at 91. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 96-108
and accompanying text.
31. 342 Pa. Super. 156, 492 A.2d 439 (1985).
32. Id. at 160, 492 A.2d at 441. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 111113 and accompanying text.
33. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 526, 539 A.2d at 359. Justice Larsen stated: "The court in
Sensenig determined that such [personal injury] assignments are void, in part, because a
personal injury involves rights which are personal to the individual injured and are considered to be of concern only to the individual injured." Id. (emphasis in original).
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ing to the majority of the court, does not involve personal injury. 4
Such a claim involves pecuniary interests only.3 5 Thus, the court
concluded that the rights involved in Hedlund were along the lines
of property rights which could be assigned before being
liquidated."
Justice Larsen lastly discussed the issue of whether public policy
37
would prevent a client from assigning a legal malpractice claim.
The majority opinion noted that some jurisdictions, in seeking to
protect the attorney-client relationship, prohibit such assignments.3" To illustrate, Justice Larsen cited a number of cases from
other jurisdictions in which the courts "equate a legal malpractice
action with torts," and thus, do not permit the assignment of such
cases.

9

One of the leading cases, Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Incor-

porated,4 0 held that because of the "uniquely personal nature" of
legal services and the contract predicated thereon, a cause of action for legal malpractice is not assignable.4 1
The Hedlund court went on to point out that other jurisdictions
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The court concluded: "The rights involved are more akin to property rights
which can be assigned prior to liquidation." Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id.
38. Id. See Clement v. Prestwich, 114 111.App. 3d 479, 448 N.E.2d 1039 (1983); Chaffee v. Smith, 95 Nev. 222, 645 P.2d 966 (1982); and Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal.
App. 3d 389, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1976).
39. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 526, 539 A.2d at 359. See supra note 38.
40. 62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1976).
41. Id. at 397, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The Hedlund court also cited Clement v.
Prestwich, 114 Ill. App. 3d 479, 448 N.E.2d 1039 (1983), which dealt with the assignment of
a cause of action for legal malpractice stemming from an attorney's negligent handling of a
bankruptcy proceeding for the assignor. The issue on appeal was whether such a cause of
action for legal malpractice was assignable. The appellate court of Illinois held that it was
not assignable, reasoning that the legal malpractice claim of a client against his attorney
arises out of a personal relationship with the attorney in which the attorney has breached a
personal duty to the client, resulting in a personal injury to the client. The court further
reasoned that public policy prohibits the assignment of such claims because the assignee is a
stranger to this relationship, suffers no injury from the attorney's negligence and is owed no
duty by the attorney. Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 1040-41.
Lastly, the Hedlund court cited Chaffee v. Smith, 98 Nev. 222, 645 P.2d 966 (1982), where
the issue on appeal was whether public policy permitted the enforcement of a legal malpractice action transferred by assignment or by levy and execution sale. The Supreme Court of
Nevada held that:
[Als a matter of public policy, we cannot permit enforcement of a legal malpractice
action which has been transferred by assignment or by levy and execution sale, but
which was never pursued by the original client ....
The decision as to whether to
bring a malpractice action against an attorney is one peculiarly vested in the client.
Id. at 222, 645 P.2d at 966.
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do permit legal malpractice actions to be assigned."2 One of the
cases, Collins v. Fitzwater," held that a lay corporate director, who
was liable to the plaintiff purchasers of unregistered, nonexempt
securities issued in violation of state blue sky laws, may assign his
claim of indemnity against the corporate attorney-director to the
plaintiffs, thus giving them an enforceable right of action which is
not void as against public policy."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that an attorney
will not be permitted to use the attorney-client relationship as a
"shield" for protection against a legal malpractice claim."5 If an attorney has harmed his client, no relationship remains to be protected.4 6 The supreme court reversed, without further elaboration,
the superior court opinion and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix, filed a dissenting
opinion.4 8 According to Justice Flaherty, a cause of action for legal
malpractice should not be assignable."9 The majority's decision
that such actions are assignable, according to the dissenters, destroys the rule that personal actions are not assignable." Justice
Flaherty, citing Goodley, stated that there are also important public policy reasons for not allowing such assignments.5 1 Additionally,
Justice Flaherty quoted from the Goodley court decision, which
concluded that the allowance of such assignments might "relegate
the legal malpractice action to the market place," thus turning the
malpractice action into a "commodity" to be exploited by persons
42. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 526, 539 A.2d at 359 (citing Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co.,
517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Collins v. Fitzwater, 277 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977)).
43. 277 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977).
44. Id. at -, 560 P.2d at 1078. Collins involved the assignment of a lay corporate
director's cause of action against the corporation's attorney for his negligence in issuing
unregistered securities to the purchasers of those securities. The issue on appeal was
whether the director could assign such a cause of action. The court held that the director
could assign his claim against the attorney. Id.
The Hedlund court also cited Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), which is discussed infra notes 159-165 and accompanying text.
45. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 526, 539 A.2d at 359.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 527, 539 A.2d at 359-60.
49. Id.
50. Id. Justice Flaherty cited Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 774 (1983), for
his conclusion that such personal actions are not assignable. For further discussion of this
case, see infra notes 131-157 and accompanying text.
51. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 527, 539 A.2d at 359 (citing Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc.,
62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (1976)).
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having a malpractice claim by assigning the claims to others who
have no relationship with the attorney involved and to whom the
attorney owed no legal duty.52 Finally, the dissent recognized that
the Goodley court found that allowing the assignment of a legal
malpractice action would lead to a debasement of the legal profession. 3 For these reasons, the dissenters contended that Hedlund,
as an assignee, should not have been permitted to maintain the
legal malpractice action against Spivak and his law firm.6 '
As the majority in Hedlund noted, Pennsylvania has long permitted the assignment of a cause of action. One of the earliest
assignment cases in Pennsylvania was Galey v. Mellon. 6 In Galey,
the legal plaintiff, Samuel Galey, contracted in writing with the defendant, W.L. Mellon, to drill an oil well.5 7 The same day the Galey/Mellon contract was entered into, Galey made a parole assignment of the contract to Smith Brothers contractors, the use
plaintiffs, in consideration of $180.00.58 The Smith Brothers, who
brought suit in Galey's name, performed the work under the contract.59 Mellon claimed that one of the wells was defectively drilled
owing to the negligence of one of the Smith Brothers' superintendents, and that Galey did not have the right to assign the contract.60
52. Id. at 527-28, 539 A.2d at 359-60 (quoting Goodley, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 133
Cal. Rptr. at 87).
The almost certain end result of merchandizing such causes of action is the lucrative
business of factoring malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified law suits
against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers. The endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the legal profession but the
already overburdened judicial system, restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the
highly confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney and client.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 528, 539 A.2d at 360.
55. Id. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358.
56. 172 Pa. 443, 33 A. 560 (1896).
57. Id. at 443, 33 A. at 560. The parties entered into the contract on April 1, 1893.
Under the terms of the contract, Galey was to furnish all the necessary instrumentalities for
completing the well at his own expense. Mellon would supply the wood, rig, casing, machinery and water. Mellon was to pay 90 cents a foot for the drilling. Id.
58. Id. It was also noted that the Smith Bros. were not subcontractors on this job. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. One of the plaintiff's points for charge stated that if the jury found from the
evidence that Smith Bros. was performing work under the contract with Mellon's knowledge, then they succeeded to the rights of Galey under the contract, with no objection on
the part of Mellon, and that this would amount to a ratification of the assignment on the
part of Mellon. The trial court affirmed this charge. Id. at 445, 33 A. at 560. The plaintiffs
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Addressing the issue of whether a party to an executory contract
may assign that contract and all rights thereunder, 6 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an executory contract may be assigned along with all the right the first party enjoyed under the
contract.2
In addition to holding that the contract and rights thereunder
were assignable, the Galey court went on to say that Galey's personal performance could not have been contemplated by Galey and
Mellon at the time they entered into the contract; nor could Galey's personal performance have been the inducement or essence of
the contract.6 3 The court also noted that Galey could have chosen
to assign his rights under the contract to the Smith Brothers after
completion of the work assigned to them."' But in either event,
Smith Brothers, as the use plaintiffs, had the right to use Galey's
name as the legal plaintiff, although the rights of the Smith Brothers, as assignee, would not be greater than the rights of Galey, as
assignor, under the contract.6 5
Approximately sixteen years later, in Coons V. McKees Rocks
Borough,6 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the assignment of a claim for damage to real property resulting from a
change in the grade of a street within the borough. 7 The Coons
court stated that assignments of this type had been recognized in
recovered a verdict and judgment for $3,227.68 and Mellon appealed. Id. at 444-45, 33 A. at
560.
61. Id. at 446, 33 A. at 560.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court noted that this type'of work required a number of men. Further, it
did not appear that Galey's "knowledge, experience or pecuniary ability, or any other reason" made him uniquely qualified to carry out this work. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 243 Pa. 340, 90 A. 141 (1914).
67. Id. at 346, 90 A. at 144. The facts of this case are somewhat complex. In January,
1903, the Pittsburgh Railroad Co. leased a parcel of real property, located in McKees Rocks
Borough, to J.N. Coons for twenty years. In December, 1903, the lease was assigned to Margaret Coons. In 1907, the borough raised the grade of the street in front of the property,
causing some damage to the buildings on the property. In February, 1909, Margaret Coons
assigned the lease and a claim for damages which arose out of the grade change to Emma
McFarland. In April of that same year, damages were assessed and Mrs. McFarland was
awarded $1,750, and the defendants appealed to the court of common pleas. In July 1909,
Mrs. McFarland died, and in her will she left the remainder of the lease to her husband. She
did not mention her damage claim in the will. Id. at 342, 90 A. at 142. An agreement was
subsequently signed by the defendant and Mr. McFarland to proceed with the trial. In November, 1911, Mr. McFarland assigned the lease and damage claim to Charles Warren. At
trial, the plaintiff was awarded $4,000 and the defendant appealed to the supreme court. Id.
at 343, 90 A. at 143.
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the past."8 The court cited McFadden v. Johnson 9 and Warrell v.
Wheeling Etc. Railway Company7" as authority for this proposition. Based upon the holding and rationale of McFadden and Warrell, the Coons court concluded that the assignment of a claim for
damages to real property is valid.71
Some years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with
the assignment of an insured's cause of action against its insurer
for acting in bad faith in the settlement of the insured's claim in
the case of Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.7 2 In
this case, Robert Gray, the plaintiff, brought an action in trespass
against Robert MacLatchie to recover for personal injuries and
73
property damage resulting from an automobile accident.
MacLatchie, who was insured by the Nationwide Insurance Company at the time of the accident, was also defended by that company in the lawsuit. 74 MacLatchie's policy had a $5,000 limit; Gray,
however, recovered a $15,000 jury verdict. 75 Nationwide paid Gray
the policy limit, and Gray sought the balance of the judgment from
MacLatchie, who subsequently assigned to Gray his claim against
68. Id. at 346, 90 A. at 144.
69. 72 Pa. 335 (1869). In McFadden, the supreme court held that where real property
has been damaged prior to title being deeded to another, the right to damages for injury to
the land stays with the prior owner unless "expressly conveyed" along with the land. The
rationale behind this holding is that the damage to the real property is a personal claim
which rests with the owner and, therefore, does not run with the land. Id. at 336.
70. 130 Pa. 600, 18 A. 1014 (1890). In Warrell, the court applied the McFadden holding to tenants in common. Here, a tract of land, a farm, which was jointly owned by and
between five brothers and sisters as tenants in common, was damaged as a result of railroad
construction. Damages were assessed at $800.00, and that amount was awarded to the owners, although the award was never paid by the defendant. Over a two year period, one of the
brothers obtained, through devise or conveyance, all the interests of his co-tenants in the
farm. However, he did not obtain through those instruments the damage claims his former
co-tenants held against the railroad company with respect to the farm. After bringing a
successful ejectment action against the railroad and collecting the damage award, the
brother claimed the entire award as the "sole owner of the legal title on which the action of
ejectment was grounded." The trial court rejected this contention and distributed the award
among the former co-tenants in accord with their interests in the property. Id. at 607-08, 18
A. at 1014-15. On appeal, the supreme court held that joint tenants in real property whose
land is damaged prior to their selling their interests in another, with the damage claim being
liquidated subsequent to the sale, are still entitled to their portion of the recovery, provided
they do not assign or convey their claim along with the land. Id. at 609-10, 18 A. at 1015.
71. Coons, 243 Pa. at 346, 90 A. at 144.
72. 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
73. Id. at 502, 223 A.2d at 8.
74. Id.
75. Id. "Post-trial motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial were denied and the
judgment entered on the verdict was affirmed per curiam, on May 22, 1961, by this Court:
Gray v. MacLatchie, 403 Pa. 595, 170 A.2d 590 (1961)." Id.
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Nationwide for acting in bad faith." Gray instituted an action in
assumpsit to recover the balance of his judgment against Nationwide. 7 Nationwide demurred and the trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing Gray's complaint. 7 The superior court, in a 3-3
79
decision, affirmed the trial court's ruling.
After determining that MacLatchie had a right of action against
Nationwide and that MacLatchie did not first have to pay the balance of the judgment to Gray before asserting his claim, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether an
insured's claim of bad faith against his insurer could be assigned."
The court held that MacLatchie could assign his claim to Gray.8
In reaching its conclusion, the court refuted a number of arguments presented by Nationwide. First, the court rejected the argument that Gray was not a party to the relationship between
MacLatchie and Nationwide, and therefore, that Nationwide owed
him no duty. Second, the court opined that Gray actually benefited
from Nationwide's failure to settle the claim within its policy limits, and therefore, Gray should not be permitted "to do indirectly
by assignment what he cannot do directly."82
Although the supreme court found the premises of Nationwide's
arguments to be correct, the court rejected these arguments as irrelevant to the facts of the case.8 3 The court reasoned that Gray
was not suing in his own right, but rather, owing to the assignment, was standing in MacLatchie's shoes.8 '
It is immaterial, therefore, that no duty is owed to Gray in his on right by
the insurer and that, while Gray may be said to have benefited by the failure to settle, MacLatchie was definitely injured thereby. . . . [I]f
76. Id. at 502-03, 223 A.2d at 9. The assignment satisfied any obligation of MacLatchie
to Gray regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit between Gray and Nationwide. Id. at 502,
223 A.2d at 9.
77. Id. at 502-03, 223 A.2d at 9.
78. Id. at 503, 223 A.2d at 9. In his complaint, Gray stated that prior to the first
lawsuit between Gray and MacLatchie, he offered to settle with Nationwide within the limitsof MacLatchie's policy, but Nationwide, "allegedly in bad faith," refused to settle. Id.
(emphasis in original). MacLatchie's policy stated: "The company may make any investigation, negotiation and settlement of claim or any suit as it deems expedient." Id. Due to the
$10,000 over the policy limit being recovered by Gray, MacLatchie had the right to seek
reimbursement from Nationwide for the entire judgment. Since MacLatchie assigned all his
rights under the insurance contract to Gray, he could sue Nationwide for the balance. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 506, 223 A.2d at 10-11.
81. Id. at 510, 223 A.2d at 12.
82. Id. at 506, 223 A.2d at 11.
83. Id. at 507, 223 A.2d at 11.
84. Id.
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MacLatchie's cause of action [could] be assigned to Gray, then Gray
[could], as any other assignee, do indirectly what he could not have done
directly. 8

The next issue discussed in Gray was whether MacLatchie had a
cause of action in assumpsit or tort against Nationwide. 6 The
court determined that MacLatchie's cause of action was in assumpsit8 7 The court held that an insurer, such as Nationwide, may
be held liable for the entire amount of a judgment obtained by a
third person against the insured if the insurer acts in bad faith in
failing to accept a settlement offer while carrying out its contractual duties.8 In so holding, the court stated that since the measure
of damages can be fixed in an assumpsit action, the action may be
assigned. 9
Lastly, the Gray court addressed the public policy criticisms of
its holding."0 A primary public policy reason for not allowing the
assignment was that such an assignment would promote "fraud
and collusion" between people like Gray and MacLatchie 1 The
court responded, however, by stating that such an assignment
would not increase the possibility of collusion because, regardless
of whether the action would be brought in the name of the assignee, the assignor was only interested in relieving himself of the
excess judgment, and the assignee was only seeking to assure himself of the excess balance of the damages which he was owed. 2 If
the assignor's liability is terminated by the assignment, the possi85. Id. (emphasis in original). In a footnote the court noted: "The statement that Gray
has benefited from Nationwide's failure to settle because it resulted in a larger verdict for
Gray is oversimplified. Gray had to expend considerable more time and money in order to
bring suit than he would have if Nationwide had accepted his settlement offer." Id. n.5.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 508, 223 A.2d at 11.
88. Id. (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 468, 134 A.2d
223, 227 (1957)). The rationale behind this holding can be found in Wiener v. Targan, 100
Pa. Super. 278, (1930), where it was held that the contractual relationship between insurer
and insured calls for a "high degree of good faith" in the insurer's handling of a case for an
insured. Id. at 284. The Gray court next cited Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320 (1963), where it was held that:
[B]y asserting in the policy the right to handle all claims against the insured, including the right to make a binding settlement, the insurer assumes a fiduciary position
towards the insured and becomes obligated to act in good faith and with due care in
representing the interests of the insured.
Id. at 59, 188 A.2d at 322 (emphasis in original).
89. Gray, 422 Pa. at 510, 223 A.2d at 12.
90. Id. at 510, 223 A.2d at 12-13.
91. Id. at 510, 223 A.2d at 13.
92. Id.
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bility of collusion is even more remote as the assignor, having been
relieved of the judgment, no longer has any "pecuniary interest" in
the outcome of the litigation.9 3
The Pennsylvania courts have adhered to the rule that the assignment of a cause of action to recover for personal injuries is prohibited.9 4 Therefore, before determining whether a claim is assignable, the court must first determine whether the assigned claim is
for damages for personal injury.9 5 In Sensenig v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
"strictly personal" cause of action is not assignable, stating that
the general principle in both law and equity is that a cause of action for a "pure tort" is "not the subject of an assignment."9 7
In Sensenig, Levi Sensenig brought an action against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to recover damages for discrimination
on the basis of freight charges for cattle that he shipped on the
defendant railroad. 8 Subsequent to the case going to issue, Levi
Sensenig assigned "all my right, title, interest, equity, claim and
demand in a certain suit now pending in the court of common
pleas of Lancaster county" to his son Daniel H. Sensenig. 9 Daniel
Sensenig was also empowered to mark the suit to his use, thus allowing him to bring the action. 100 The Pennsylvania Railroad Company then filed a petition which led to the granting of a rule to
show cause why Daniel Sensenig, the use plaintiff, should not be
stricken from the record. 10 Subsequently, the rule was made absolute and Daniel Sensenig appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.1 02
The supreme court stated that the issue was whether a suit for
discrimination brought pursuant to the Act of June 4, 1883103 is
93. Id.
94. Hedlund Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Weiser, STapler & Spivak, 517 Pa. 522, 525, 539 A.2d
357,358 (1988); Gray, 442 Pa. at 510, 223 A.2d at 13.
95. Hedlund, 517 Pa. at 525, 539 A.2d at 358.
96. 229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910).
97. Id. at 172, 78 A. at 91.
98. Id. at 170, 78 A. at 91.
99. Id. at 171, 78 A. at 91.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Act of June 4, 1883, No. 64, § 2, 1883 Pa. Laws 72. Section 2 of the act provides:
No railroad company or other common carrier engaged in the transportation of property, shall charge, demand or receive from any person, company or corporation, for
the transportation of property, or for any other service, a greater sum than it shall
charge or receive from any other person, company or corporation for a like service,
from the same place, upon like conditions, and under similar circumstances; and all
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assignable before a verdict is reached.' 4 It was determined that
such an action, by its nature, is one of tort to recover "unliquidated damages.' 0 5 The statement of claim revealed that the
charge was for discriminating against the plaintiff in favor of a
business competitor. 0 6 The court reasoned that a claim of this
type was not for the recovery of any specific property, that the
claim was seeking damages for the injury caused by the unlawful
interference with the plaintiff's right to do business with the railroad upon equal terms with his competitor, and such a right was
07
not a property right, capable of assignment, prior to liquidation.1
The court concluded that whether the claim was regarded as a
statutory penalty or a tort action, the right to bring the action was
a "personal privilege" and was not assignable. 0 8
Pennsylvania has followed the rule established in Sensenig
through the years. In Sniderman v. Nerone, °9 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that unliquidated claims for damages for personal injuries are not assignable or subject to attachment." 0 The
concessions in rates and drawbacks shall be allowed to all persons, companies or corporations alike, for such transportation and service, upon like conditions, under similar circumstances and during the same period of time. Nor shall any such railroad
company or common carrier make any undue or unreasonable discrimination between
individuals and transportation companies, or the furnishing of facilities for transportation. Any violation of this provision shall make the offending company or common
carrier liable to the party injured for damage treble the amount of injury suffered.

Id.
104. Sensenig, 229 Pa. at 171, 78 A. at 91.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 172, 78 A. at 92.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 336 Pa. 305, 9 A.2d 335, aff'g per curiam, 136 Pa. Super. 385, 7 A.2d 496 (1939).
110. 136 Pa. Super. at 384, 7 A.2d at 498. Sniderman involved an attachment proceeding. Domenic Nerone brought an action in trespass against Equitable Gas Co. to recover for
personal injuries. He recovered a verdict for $2,500.00. Id. Subsequently, a Mr. Sniderman
executed an attachment on Nerone's judgment and also served the attachment on Equitable
as the garnishee. Equitable obtained a new trial in which a $1,000.00 verdict was rendered in
Nerone's favor. Nerone then assigned his verdict to his attorney, J. Thomas Hoffman. Morris A. Hershenson then issued attachments on two judgments he held against Nerone. On
Equitable's motion, Nerone, Hoffman and Nerone's creditors were interpleaded to determine who was entitled to the $1,000.00 judgment against Equitable. The court of common
pleas entered judgment for Sniderman "subject to the rights and interest of J. Thomas
Hoffman, Esq." Hershenson's appeal was dismissed by the superior court and Sniderman's
appeal was quashed without prejudice. Id. at 383-84, 7 A.2d at 497-98.
In holding that unliquidated claims for damages for personal injuries are not assignable or
subject to attachment, the superior court reasoned that the assignment here was valid because the damage claim had been liquidated. "We think this was sufficient to bind any
moneys or property thereafter coming into the hands of the garnishes, up to the time of the
trial of the attachment or judgment on interrogatories." Id. at 384, 7 A.2d at 498.
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same conclusion was reached by the supreme court in Hurley v.
Hurley,"' where it was held that claims for personal injury are not
assignable.11 2 The Hurley court based its reasoning on Sensenig
and Sniderman.1 5
In Pennsylvania, the general rule has been that in order to sue
an attorney for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must establish the
relationship of attorney and client.11 4 This general rule has been
applied in cases like Lawall v. Groman,1 1 5 which involved an action
in trespass to recover damages owing to the negligence of an attorney in doing an improper title examination. " 6 In Lawall, the plaintiff had $1,000 which she wished to invest. 17 The defendant attorney, after learning of this, wrote the plaintiff's brother stating that
she could make a good investment on a first mortgage at six percent interest. " 8 After the defendant and the plaintiff's brother had
viewed the property,11 9 a meeting was arranged in which the loan
was to be made.12 0 In the interim, the defendant agreed to do a
title examination and write the bond and mortgage. 2 " The day of
the transaction was the first time that the plaintiff had spoken to
the defendant; she also did not ask him to be her attorney and
paid him no fee. The mortgagor in this transaction paid the defendant's fee. 22 Subsequently, the plaintiff learned that her mort111. 342 Pa. Super. 156, 492 A.2d 439 (1985).
112. Id. at 160, 492 A.2d at 441. Hurley involved a divorce action. John and Thelma
Hurley were married in 1955, separated in 1981, and divorced in 1983. The trial court ordered that Thelma Hurley's recovery of $28,131.80 for personal injuries, sustained prior to
the separation, be included in the marital property. Thelma Hurley, on appeal, argued that
the personal injury damage recovery was not marital property. Id. at 158-59, 492 A.2d at
440. The superior court agreed, holding that such a claim only becomes part of marital
property after it has been liquidated.
Appellant's claim for personal injury in the instant case became liquidated by verdict
after the parties had separated. We conclude, therefore, that appellant's recovery of
damages for personal injuries in this case was not marital property which the court
could properly divide between the parties. It represented property acquired after
separation.
Id. at 161, 492 A.2d at 441-42.
113. Id. at 160-61, 492 A.2d at 441.
114. See Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa. Super. 418, 476 A.2d 22 (1984).
115. 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
116. Id. at 534, 37 A. at 98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 535, 37 A. at 98.
119. Id. at 534, 37 A. at 98. The property, consisting of a house and lot, was owned by
O.T. Roberts, who wished to borrow $1,000.00 on the same. Id.
120. Id. at 535, 37 A. at 98.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 534-36, 37 A. at 98.
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gage was in fact a third mortgage on the property, not a first mortgage, and that her lien on the property was of no value; she then
brought an action against the defendant attorney. 2 3 The defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to establish an attorney-client relationship, and the trial court
124
granted the motion.
The rule to be inferred from this early opinion is that in order to
bring a legal malpractice action, an attorney-client relationship
must first be established. 12 5 The supreme court reasoned that although payment of a fee is the most "usual and weighty" evidence
to establish the attorney-client relationship, it is not indispensable.' 2 6 Although the defendant was acting on behalf of the borrower, who paid his fee, that alone did not prevent the existence of
an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.127 The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence
of the existence of the relationship to submit the question to a
jury."18 The supreme court also pointed out that if the defendant
knew that the plaintiff was relying on his professional skills to
make sure that her mortgage was first in time, regardless of her not
paying his fee, and he undertook to perform that service, he was
bound to do so with "ordinary and reasonable skill and care in his
profession" and could be held liable for negligence if he failed to
do so."2 9 The judgment of the lower court was reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 3 0
In Guy v. Liederbach,'3 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the privity requirement to bring an action for legal
malpractice was satisfied when a named legatee in a will, claiming
to be an intended third party beneficiary, attempted to bring a legal malpractice action against the attorney-scrivener of the will. 13
In Guy, Edward Kent retained Harry J. Liederbach to draft his
will.' 3"3 The will stated that Mrs. Frances Guy was the beneficiary
123. Id. at 535, 37 A. at 98.
124. Id. at 537, 37 A. at 99. The defendant also moved for a nonsuit on two other
grounds. First, that there was no evidence of negligence, fraud or collusion; and second, that
there was no evidence of any damages sustained by the plaintiff. Id.
125. Id. at 538, 37 A. at 99.
126. Id. at 537-38, 37 A. at 99.
127. Id. at 538, 37 A. at 99.
128. Id. at 539, 37 A. at 99.
129. Id. at 540, 37 A. at 99.
130. Id. at 542, 37 A. at 99.
131. 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
132. Id. at 51, 459 A.2d at 746.
133. Id. at 52, 459 A.2d at 747.
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of the residuary estate, as well as executrix of the estate."" Kent
signed the will with Guy and Liederbach serving as witnesses.'3 5
Subsequently, Kent died and the will was submitted for probate in
New Jersey.' The New Jersey probate court, however, declared
Mrs. Guy's legacy void "because she was a subscribing witness to
the will" in violation of a New Jersey statute which subsequently
was repealed. 13 7 The court's decision barred the plaintiff from taking her share in the Kent estate which was worth $45,000.138
Mrs. Guy filed suit, in both trespass and assumpsit, against the
defendant attorney in the court of common pleas, Bucks County,
Pennsylvania.' 39 She alleged that the defendant's conduct was negligent and also that it constituted a breach of the contract between
Kent and Liederbach. " 0 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that Kent had property in New
Jersey. "1 Liederbach demurred, alleging that an attorney-client relationship did not exist, thus barring the malpractice action. " The
trial court dismissed Mrs. Guy's action, but the superior court reversed, holding that Mrs. Guy could bring the action against
Liederbach based on either a negligence theory or a third party
beneficiary theory. 4 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted re4
view of the case."
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. "Mrs. Guy qualified as executrix in the office of the surrogate in Camden,
New Jersey," but she resigned her appointment due to the challenge of her right to inherit
under the will. Id.
137. Id. at 52, 459 A.2d at 747.
138. Id. at 53, 459 A.2d at 747.
139. Id.
140. Id. The complaint alleged:
19. The actions and conduct of the defendant Liederbach in directing and advising
the plaintiff to become an attesting witness to the will of Edward J. Kent, Jr., was
negligent as contrary to the ordinary and reasonable standards for duly licensed attorneys within the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 20. The action and conduct of the
defendant Liederbach in directing and advising the plaintiff to become an attesting
witness to the will of Edward J. Kent, Jr., amounted to a breach of the contract
between Edward J. Kent, Jr. and defendant Liederbach to which plaintiff, Frances E.
Guy was a third party beneficiary.
Id.
141. Id. at 53, 459 A.2d at 748.
142. Id. at 54, 459 A.2d at 748. Liederbach also alleged that the "complaint failed to
state facts sufficient to establish negligence on the part of Liederbach and that the New
Jersey statutes and the Camden County Probate Court's decision based on them barred
Guy's suit." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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The supreme court first considered whether Mrs. Guy could
maintain her malpractice claim under a negligence theory.'4 5 The
court held that under "present Pennsylvania law," a person who
established an attorney-client relationship could sue his attorney
in trespass or assumpsit for malpractice."" 6 The court concluded
that "at the very least," Lawall' 47 required that an attorney must
specifically undertake to perform specified services for a third person who has relied upon the attorney to perform those services,
with knowledge on the part of the attorney that the third party
has so relied, in order for the third party to file suit. 48 The court
further opined that since Mrs. Guy could not have had Liederbach
"specifically undertake" to write Kent's will for her, in order to
make her a residuary beneficiary, she did not state a cause of action under Lawall.14 1 The court went on to hold that in order to
sue for legal malpractice a plaintiff must establish the attorneyclient relationship "or a specific undertaking by the attorney furnishing professional services, as in Lawall."'5 0
The next issue considered by the Guy court was whether Mrs.
Guy could bring the malpractice suit under a third party beneficiary theory. 51 The court held that section 302 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS' 5 2

allowed a "properly restricted

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
148. 501 Pa. at 55, 459 A.2d 749.
149. Id. The court went on to state that Mrs. Guy:
[Clould not rely on the attorney's professional expertise because he could not employ
his expertise on her behalf in such a manner. Such a beneficiary is left without any
remedy for the failed legacy. Because she is a beneficiary, she could not have had
privity with the attorney, nor could any specific undertaking have been arranged between them. The intentions of the testator and the expectation of the named beneficiary are thus frustrated under the strict privity rule, despite the dicta in Lawall.
Id.
150.
151.

Id. at 58, 459 A.2d at 750.
Id.

152.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 302 (1979) states:

Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
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cause of action" for third party beneficiaries such as Mrs. Guy.1"'
Applying the section 302 analysis to beneficiaries under a will, the
court held that the "underlying" contract is between the attorneyscrivener and his client.15 However, if the beneficiary is named in
the instrument, the testator's intent to benefit that person is
clearly displayed. 15 The court therefore stated that section 302(1)
recognizes a "right to performance in the beneficiary" which would
be "appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties" since the
estate either cannot or will not bring suit. 156 The court concluded
by holding that a cause of action in assumpsit, which follows the

principles set forth in section 302 of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

would protect the needs of the third party beneficiary,
while at the same time consider the "legitimate concerns" of the
attorneys involved in this type of litigation.'
In concluding that a cause of action for legal malpractice may be
assigned in some circumstances, the Hedlund court noted that
other jurisdictions permit such assignments.1 5 1 One of the cases the
court examined was Oppel v. Empire Mutual Insurance Company. 59 In Oppel, the plaintiff's infant son was hit by the inCONTRACTS,

153. 501 Pa. at 59, 459 A.2d 751. The court went on to state:
There is thus a two part test for determining whether one is an intended third party
beneficiary: (1) the recognition of the beneficiary's right must be 'appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties,' and (2) the performance must 'satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary' or 'the circumstances indicate
that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.'
Id.
154. Id. at 61, 459 A.2d at 751.
155. Id.
156. Id. The court also noted that:
Since only named beneficiaries can bring suit, they meet the first step standing requirement of sec. 302. Being named beneficiaries of the will, the legatees are intended, rather than incidental, beneficiaries who would be sec. 302(1)(b) beneficiaries
for whom 'the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.' In the case of a testator-attorney contract, the attorney is the promisor, promising to draft a will which carries out the
testator's intention to benefit the legatees. The testator is the promisee, who intends
that the named beneficiaries have the benefit of the attorney's promised performance.
The circumstances which clearly indicate the testator's intent to benefit a named legatee are his arrangements with the attorney and the text of his will.
Id. 22
157. Id. at 63, 459 A.2d at 753.
158. Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 517 Pa. 522, 526, 539 A.2d 357,
359 (1988)(citing Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Collins
v. Fitzwater, 277 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977)). Collins is discussed supra note 44.
159. 517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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sured's car and very seriously injured.16 0 The plaintiff, who knew of
the $10,000 limit on the insured's auto insurance policy, offered to
settle the case for that amount. 6 1 The insured, who was represented by Empire Mutual Insurance Company, shared a willing-2
ness to settle if an amount in the area of $500 could be saved.',
The plaintiff alleged that that proposal, as well as other conduct in
refusing to settle amounted to bad faith on the part of the insured."'3 At trial, the plaintiff was awarded $420,850 in damages."6 4
Subsequently, the insured assigned his bad faith claim against Empire Mutual and his attorney to the plaintiff.'
One of the issues on appeal was whether the insured's cause of
action against an attorney, provided to him by his insurer for malpractice in failing to settle a suit against the insured, may be assigned.16 6 The United States district court held that the cause of
action for legal malpractice against the attorney who was designated by Empire Mutual to represent the insured was assignable
as it was based upon both a beach of implied contract and negligence and did not involve personal injuries, but purely pecuniary
16 7

ones.

In the Hedlund dissent, Justice Flaherty relied heavily on the
case of Goodley v. Wank and Wank, Incorporated.6 ' In Goodley,
Eleanor Katz was represented by the law firm of Wank and Wank
in a divorce proceeding.6 9 Wank and Wank negligently advised her
that they would need to neither retain a number of insurance policies, of which Katz was the beneficiary, nor obtain a court order
preventing her husband from changing the policies.17 0 During the
160. Id. at 1306.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The court stated:
This action by plaintiff, as assignee of the insured under the policy, is for bad faith of
the insurance company in rejecting the offer to settle the case for the $10,000 limit of
the policy to the detriment of the insured who thereafter was cast in liability in a
very substantial sum beyond the policy limit. This cause of action is recognized in
New York. Bad faith by the insurer would include: (1) a failure to investigate; (2) a
refusal to settle within the policy limits; (3) failure to inform the insured of a compromise offer; and (4) failure to induce the insured to contribute.

Id.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1307.
Id.
62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1976).
Id. at 391-92, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
Id.
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court proceedings, Katz's husband found and cancelled the policies
without her knowledge and died a short time later."' Katz subsequently assigned her legal malpractice claim to Harry Goodley,
who filed a negligence action against Wank and Wank. 172 Wank
the trial
and Wank filed a motion for summary judgment which
17 3
court granted, and Goodley appealed from that order.
The issue before the California Court of Appeals was whether a
legal malpractice action is assignable. 174 The court held that such a
cause of action is not assignable. 175 The court noted that with the
enactment of sections 953176 and 954177 of the California Civil
Code, the old common law rule of nonassignability of causes of action was replaced by a basic public policy that the "[a]ssignability
of things in action is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception.
. . .[A]nd this exception is confined to wrongs done to the person,
and to conthe reputation, of the feelings of the injured party,
178
tracts of a purely personal nature, like marriage.
This exception to the assignability of legal claims led the court
to conclude that because a legal malpractice action consists of an
attorney's negligence, which proximately causes the plaintiff to
suffer damages, it gives rise to a tort action, as well as a breach of
contract action, since attorneys usually perform services for their
clients pursuant to an express or implied contract.1 9 Thus, a legal
malpractice action is not assignable in California due to the
"uniquely personal nature of the legal services and the contract"
171. Id.
172. Id. Goodley alleged that he was:
[TIhe owner of the claim [legal malpractice] against defendants herein by virtue of a
written assignment by Eleanor Rae Katz . . .that defendant's erroneous advice that
she was protected in her property rights, was the proximate cause of her loss of the
proceeds from the policies; and that as a result of the defendant's negligence, she has
been damaged in the sum of $147,000.
Id. The opinion does not make clear why Katz assigned her malpractice claim. Id.
173. Id. at 392, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
174. Id. at 393, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
175. Id. at 395, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86. See also Clement v. Prestwich, 114 Ill. App. 3d
479, 448 N.E.2d 1039 (1983) and Chaffee v. Smith, 98 Nev. 222, 645 P.2d 966 (1982).
176. Section 953 of the California Civil Code provides in pertinent part: "A thing in
action is a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 953 (West 1982).
177. Section 954 of the California Civil Code provides in pertinent part: "A thing in
action arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be
transferred by the owner .. " CAL. Civ. CODE § 954 (West 1982).
178. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
179. Id.
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from which a highly confidential relationship arises."1 0
The Goodley court also cited a number of public policy considerations to support its holding. 181 Specifically, the California court
took into account the "unique quality" and "personal nature" of
the attorney's services, as well as the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.1 82 The court further noted that if such assignments were permitted, legal malpractice claims would be
placed on the auction block to be sold to the highest bidder, a bidder who never had any relationship with the attorney and to whom
the attorney owed no duty."8 3 The court warned that to commercialize the legal malpractice claim through assignment would ulti84
mately lead to the debasement of the legal profession.1
Hedlund is the first case in Pennsylvania, to date, in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has permitted the assignment of a
claim for legal malpractice. In allowing the assignment of such a
claim, the court broke from its longstanding rule, as established in
cases such as Guy v. Liederbach,'85 of not permitting a person to
sue an attorney for malpractice unless the attorney-client relationship is first established.' 8 6 It now appears that in Pennsylvania an
attorney will no longer be able to use the attorney-client relationship as a defense against a legal malpractice claim which is assigned to a third party in cases similar to Hedlund.
In looking back over the opinion and the history flowing from
Hedlund, however, it does not appear that the court has made any
other substantial changes in the area of assignments. The court
continues to require, as it has in prior cases such as Galey v. Mellon 87 and Sensenig v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,88 that
180. Id. at 395, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
181. Id. at 397, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
182. Id.
183. Id. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
184. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87. The court also noted:
Public policy encourages those who believe they have claims to solve their problems
in a court of law and secure a judicial adjustment of their differences. The California
Supreme Court has emphatically rejected the concept of self help. However, the ever
present threat of assignment and the possibility that ultimately the attorney may be
confronted with the necessity of defending himself against the assignee of an irresponsible client who, because of dissatisfaction with legal services rendered and out of
resentment and/or for monetary gain, has discounted a purported claim for malpractice by assigning the same, would most surely result in a selective process for carefully choosing clients thereby rendering a disservice to the public and the profession.
Id. at 397-98, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
185. 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
186. Id. at 58, 459 A.2d at 748.
187. 172 Pa. 443, 33 A. 560 (1896).
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the assignor have a valid cause of action which is not personal in
nature.18 9 Cases such as Sniderman v. Nerone90 and Hurley v.
Hurley'9' illustrate that Pennsylvania case law still adheres to the
principle that claims for unliquidated damages are not assignable,
1 92
while claims for liquidated damages are assignable.
On the issue of privity, the Hedlund court determined that because the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor, privity was
not an issue in the case."9 3 This conclusion is not surprising as a
number of prior cases, such as Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 9 4 have held that the assignee does not sue in his
own right, but rather, due to the assignment, stands in the legal
shoes of the assignor; the assignee's rights are no greater nor less
9 5
than the rights of the assignor.1
It must also be kept in mind, however, as was accurately pointed
out in the dissent by Justice Flaherty, that there are a number of
potential dangers in permitting the assignment of a legal malpractice action.'9 6 The courts must be cautious in allowing the assignment of such claims in the future. They must ensure that in allowing these types of assignments they are not promoting unjust
lawsuits or champerty, exploiting the legal malpractice action or
attorneys who were allegedly negligent, or placing undue burdens
on the legal profession.9 7 If the courts permit the free assignability
of legal malpractice claims, without imposing regulations or restrictions upon their assignment, the dissent's fears will become realities. Free assignability of malpractice claims would result in nothing less than allowing those injured by an attorney's negligence to
auction off their claims to the highest bidders, and would certainly
lead to the debasement of the legal profession. 98
The Hedlund opinion, more than anything, appears to be a
warning to the legal practitioner that in cases where malpractice
occurs and the injury takes the form of a property interest, which
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
492 A.2d
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910).
Galey, 172 Pa. at 446, 33 A. at 560; Sensenig, 229 Pa. at 172, 78 A. at 91.
336 Pa. 305, 9 A.2d 335, aff'g per curiam, 136 Pa. Super. 381, 7 A.2d 496 (1939).
342 Pa. Super. 156, 492 A.2d 439 (1985).
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is then assigned, the attorney-client relationship may no longer be
used as a "shield" by an attorney to prevent the assignee from suing. The opinion does not seek to make radical changes in the assignment and attorney-client relation areas, but rather seeks to
give the legal consumer an added protection against the harm
which, in a very restricted number of situations, may result from
legal malpractice. Based upon the Hedlund opinion, it appears as
though the Pennsylvania courts will uphold assignments of this
type in the future.
Robert P. Boyer

